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Abstract
The deleterious effect of debt restructuring on banks’ balance sheets and, consequently, on the
economy as a whole has been a key policy issue. This paper studies how post-default fiscal policy
interacts with this sovereign-bank loop and shape the response of a model economy. Calibration of
the model matches characteristics of the Greek economy at the time of the Bond Exchange. Debt
restructuring in place of higher lump-sum taxation or non-productive government spending harms the
economy even if no other cost of default is considered. However, the sovereign-debt loop is less costly
to the economy than increases in labour or capital taxes to service debt. Even so, if fiscal policy is too
responsive, a crowding-out effect inhibits the recovery of capital markets, hence a more conservative
fiscal stance is desirable. Thus how diabolic the post-default sovereign-bank loop is depends to a
large extent on the way fiscal policy responds.
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1 Introduction
In policy discussions about the debt crisis in the Euro area, one key issue has been the
deleterious effect of sovereign debt restructuring on bank’s balance sheets and, conse-
quently, on the economy as a whole. The mechanism runs as follows: sovereign debt
restructuring leads to lower prices for sovereign debt, and thus implies a reduction in the
value of banks’ assets. This in turn forces banks to deleverage, reducing credit in the
economy and leading to a sharp fall in economic activity. In consequence, tax revenues
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fall. A recent literature has evolved to assess the importance of this sovereign-bank loop
– the so called diabolic loop.1
However, sovereign default is effectively a transfer from debt holders to the government,
not a destruction of wealth. Hence, on the one hand, a default episode tightens the
constraints on banks and forces them to deleverage, which leads to lower investment and
lower output. But on the other hand, it loosens the government’s budget constraint –
since, presumably, servicing debt would require higher taxes or less government spending.
Therefore, one of the main factors dictating what then happens to the economy is the
fiscal response after default.
This paper studies how different fiscal policy responses affect the sovereign-bank loop
in a quantitative macroeconomic model. Banks are leverage-constrained as in Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) and hold sovereign bonds.2 Several
fiscal policy instruments are considered: government purchases; lump sum taxes; taxes on
labour; taxes on capital income; taxes on banks; and taxes on consumption. The model
portrays a closed economy and abstracts from nominal rigidities and monetary policy.
Compared to models with an endogenous default decision, ours is simpler, but also easier
to quantify and, in this sense, more transparent.
The model is calibrated to capture the sovereign-bank loop in the Greek economy
following the 2012 Bond Exchange. We consider a counterfactual steady state with no
default and simulate an exogenous debt restructuring episode, modeled as a sharp fall
in current debt payments that phases out over time. We study how the reaction of the
economy to the debt restructuring shock depends on the fiscal policy response.
Debt restructuring in place of higher lump-sum taxation leads to a very persistent but
mild output drop. Even though no other cost of default is considered, the restructuring
shock leads to a fall in economic activity owing to its effects on banks’ balance sheets,
since banks are forced to deleverage. Moreover, restructuring debt instead of cutting
government consumption leads to a larger fall in investment and output. Intuitively, the
increase in government consumption following default crowds out investment, aggravating
the diabolic loop.
However, when distortionary taxation is considered, results are very different. We first
consider a tax on labour income. While debt restructuring forces banks to deleverage, it
also avoids an increase in taxes that would lead to a reduction in labour supply. In our
1Examples include Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2015), Bocola (2016), Broner et al (2014), Brunnermeier et al (2016),
Brunnermeier et al (2017), Perez (2015) and Sosa-Padilla (2015).
2A recent empirical literature highlights the importance of banks’ holdings of government debt. See, e.g, Bank of
International Settlements (2011), Andritzky (2012), De Bruyckere et al (2013), Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2013) and
Popov and Van Horen (2014).
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laboratory economy, this effect on labour supply is the dominating force and brings a halt
to the diabolic sovereign-bank loop.
In the case of consumption taxes, the response of the economy in the short run is very
similar to the case of labour taxes, but since lower consumption taxes also crowd out
investment, after a few years, output is below its level in case of no default.
When sovereign debt restructuring occurs in place of increases in taxes on capital
income or banks’ profits, the effect on investment is positive. Intuitively, default is a
one-off transfer from banks to the government, but so are taxes on banks and the latter
also affect marginal lending decisions. Owing to these positive effects on bank credit,
sovereign debt restructuring is less harmful than an increase in taxes on capital income
or on banks. The effect is particularly strong in the medium and long run – the output
response peaks only after 5 years.
We then let fiscal policy react to a greater extent to default, so taxes decrease more,
but debt recovers faster. This has a positive effect on output in the short run. However,
sovereign debt issuance crowds out space for capital investment in banks’ balance sheets,
and a more expansionary fiscal policy exacerbates this effect. In consequence, the overall
impact on the economy of a more expansionary fiscal stance is negative.
In sum, in our laboratory economy, the type of fiscal instrument and the speed of
adjustment interact with the financial disruption caused by debt restructuring. As it
turns out, this interaction is very important to determine how the economy responds.
This paper is organized as follows: the next subsection connects our contribution to
the literature. Section 2 presents the model, section 3 briefly describes the Greek Debt
Restructuring from 2012, explains how we calibrate the model and details the simulation
exercise. Results are presented in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper speaks to a growing literature on the financial disruption triggered by sovereign
default. This literature studies the so-called sovereign-bank (diabolic) loop: when leveraged-
constrained banks hold large amounts of domestic sovereign debt, default (or an increase
in default risk) leads to less credit, lower output and tax revenues, generating a feedback
loop that further worsens the government’s repayment capacity.
Sosa-Padilla (2015) extends a standard quantitative sovereign default model to endog-
enize the output costs of default via credit crunch and calibrates the model to match the
Argentinian default. Bocola (2016) models two channels through which this loop can be
provoked. In addition to the common liquidity channel, also present in this paper and
3
many others, he shows that news about sovereign risk generate a precautionary motive
for banks to deleverage (the “risk channel”). Perez (2015) stresses the relevance of the
liquidity value of public debt for banks and studies the effects of post-default bail-outs.
Broner et al (2014) analyse creditor discrimination in the presence of secondary markets.
Their model highlights the crowding-out effect present in this paper: public credit dis-
places credit for productive investment. Brunnermeier et al (2016) and Brunnermeier
et al (2017) propose a way to break the feedback mechanisms that perpetuate the loop.
They argue that changes in sovereign bonds’ prices would be almost completely smoothed
out by imposing banks to hold a quasi risk-free asset consisting of a diversified portfolio
with senior tranches of government debt.
While most of the literature explicitly models the government’s decision about default-
ing or not, we model sovereign debt restructuring as an exogenous policy shock. Despite
this simplification, our model is able to capture the liquidity effects resulting from default
and also generates the crowding-out effect that is key in these models. We contribute to
the literature by studying how this sovereign-bank loop is affected by the use of different
fiscal policy instruments and the speed of fiscal policy response.
The nature of losses from sovereign default is a question that dates back to Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981) and Bulow and Rogoff (1989). In a survey of this literature, Panizza,
Zettelmeyer and Sturzenegger (2009) argue that there is not much evidence that external
penalties are the main reason why governments repay their debts and highlight the impor-
tance of domestic costs following defaults. Indeed, a recent literature on debt crises has
aimed at exploring the channels through which default can trigger domestic output costs.
A branch of this literature has turned its attention to the link between sovereign default
and liquidity crises.3 Our results, however, raise question marks about the magnitude of
these costs.
Empirical work has explored this link between sovereign risk and banks’ financing con-
ditions. Borensztein and Panizza (2008) show empirical evidence that default episodes
tend to magnify the probability of banking crises and domestic credit crunches, associ-
ated with balance sheet effects and collapses in confidence. Andritzky (2012) points out
that the subprime crisis has affected the investor base for government securities in some
advanced G20 economies. Following the European debt crisis, Bank of International Set-
tlements (2011) highlighted that the increase in sovereign risk could affect the market
value of banks through their holdings of sovereign debt. Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi
(2013) provide evidence that sovereign bonds generate a liquidity benefit for banks in
3See, e.g., Brutti (2011) and Broner and Ventura (2011).
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normal times, but are costly during debt crises.4
The model also builds on the literature about the role of financial frictions in business
cycles and the so called “financial accelerator” channel. Many of the main contributions
to this literature introduce financial frictions as an agency problem.5 We closely follow
the modeling of financial frictions from Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and
Karadi (2011).6 Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto (2012)
study the recent financial crisis and the effects of unconventional monetary policy using
a financial accelerator model where banks face a no-moral-hazard constraint that limits
their ability to raise funds. As in other models in this literature, these frictions amplify the
effects of exogenous shocks to business cycles.7 Building on this framework, Kirchner and
Van Wijnbergen (2016) investigate fiscal policy efectiveness during a crisis when private
sector and government compete for credit from leverage-constrained banks. They show
that fiscal policy is less effective if debt cannot be directly held by households, causing a
crowding-out effect in credit provision.
There is also recent research investigating the links between sovereign risk and macroe-
conomic stability. Corsetti et al (2013) and Corsetti el al (2014) develop macroeconomic
models with financial frictions using Curdia and Woodford’s (2016) framework, but they
assume an exogenous connection between sovereign risk and banks’ spreads (loan over
deposit rates). Here, this connection is endogenous and crucial for our analysis. Bolton
and Jeanne (2011) analyse theoretically the consequences of debt crises in a financially
integrated world, where a sovereign country’s debt can be used as collateral by banks in
other countries. Guerrieri, Iacoviello and Minetti (2012) analyse the international trans-
mission of sovereign risk and default in the Eurozone through the banks’ balance sheet
channel and show that default in the so called “periphery countries” spreads to banks at
the core.
4See also De Bruyckere et al (2013) and Popov and Van Horen (2014).
5See, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999).
6This framework has been used and extended in several directions. Examples include Villa and Yang (2011), Gertler,
Kiyotaki and Queralto (2012), Dedola, Karadi and Lombardo (2013), Gertler and Karadi (2013), Correia et al (2015),
Meeks, Nelson and Alessandri (2016), Rannenberg (2016) and Villa (2016).
7Boissay, Collard and Smets (2016) expand the financial accelerator framework and are able to generate credit freezes
and banking crises as a result of endogenous pro-cyclical movements in banks’ balance sheets.
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2 Model
Our stochastic general equilibrium model is composed of a closed real economy and ab-
stracts from nominal rigidities and monetary policy.8 The model considers a government
that issues non-state contingent debt (that can be defaulted on) and a variety of fis-
cal policy instruments. The modeling of financial frictions follows Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011). The economy is populated by five types of agents:
households, good producers, capital producers, bankers and government.
2.1 Households
There is a representative household with a continuum of members of measure unity, with
a fraction 1 − f that are workers and a fraction f that are bankers. Workers supply
labour and return wages to the family, while bankers own a financial intermediary and
return dividends to their household. Households can save in form of deposits held by
intermediaries. They supply funds to banks in form of non-contingent short term debt
(deposits, denoted Dt), that pay a risk-free gross real return rate Rt. We additionally
assume households can not buy government bonds directly.
Households choose consumption (Ct), labour supply (Lt) and riskless debt to maximize
expected discounted utility. We assume preferences in logaritmic form that follow a GHH
specification, in order to avoid the wealth effects on labour supply (Greenwood, Hercowitz
and Huffman, 1988)9.
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi log
[
Ct+i − ψ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt+i
]
(1)
Households are subject to the following budget constraint:
(1 + τ ct )Ct + (Dt+1 −Dt) = (1− τwt )WtLt + (Rt − 1)(1− τ dt )Dt + Πt − TRt (2)
where Wt is the wage rate, TRt are lump-sum tranfers payed (received) to the government
and Πt are the dividends obtained from the ownership of nonfinancial firms and banks.
Tax rates are also indexed to t. Taxation is composed by consumption taxes (τ ct ) and
income taxes of two forms: taxes on wages (τwt ) and taxes on (net) returns of savings
(τ dt ).
8Differently from the literature on sovereign default that builds on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), our model does not
portrait an open economy. Our focus is instead on the debt being held by domestic banks. We are hence abstracting from
other channels through which default may harm the economy, such as external sanctions, fall in international trade and
drops in foreign direct investment.
9In the sensitivity analysis we allow alternatively for preferences following King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) and show
that conclusions are not driven by the assumption on the form of the utility function.
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From the first order conditions for consumption/saving, we get:
EtβΛt,t+1
[
(1− τ dt+1)(Rt+1 − 1) + 1
]
= 1 (3)
where Λt,t+1 is the households’ stochastic discount factor:
Λt,t+1 ≡ %t+1
%t
(1 + τ ct )
(1 + τ ct+1)
and %t is marginal utility of consumption,
%t ≡
(
Ct − ψ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt
)−1
The first order condition for labour supply writes:
ψLϕt =
(1− τwt )Wt
(1 + τ ct )
(4)
In every period, there is a probability (1−θ) that a banker becomes a worker. In order
to maintain the fraction in each occupation constant over time, in each period there is a
random fraction (1− θ)f of workers that become bankers. Workers that become bankers
receive a “start up” capital from the household to start business. Expected survival time
of a bank is thus 1/(1 − θ). This prevents bankers from accumulating enough wealth so
as to overcome their financial constraints.
Households also own nonfinancial firms (capital and goods producers). However, they
are not able to acquire capital directly or to provide funds to these firms. All financial
intermediation for production must be made by a bank.
2.2 Goods producers
The representative firm in this sector produces output in a competitive market, using
labour and capital in a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt = K
α
t L
1−α
t (5)
with 0 < α < 1.
As usual, labour demand implies that the real wage rate equals the marginal product
of labour:
Wt = (1− α)Yt
Lt
(6)
In order to produce in period t+1, firms need to buy the amount of capital Kt+1 at the
end of period t from capital producers. In order to finance the acquisition of capital, firms
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issue securities St and an arbitrage condition ensures the value of these securities equals
the value of the capital to be bought. The intermediaries buy these securities. Denoting
by Qt the price of one unit of capital, we have:
QtKt+1 = QtSt
There are no frictions in this process. Intermediaries have perfect information about the
firm and about future payoffs, so securities are state-contingent. Frictions exist within
the process of banks obtaining resources from households.
In order to satisfy the zero profit condition in the competitive market, goods producers
buy capital goods up to the point that gross profits per unit of capital Zt equal the
marginal product of this input:
Zt =
Yt −WtLt
Kt
= α
Yt
Kt
A firm that sells St securities to acquire capital must return all its profits in the next
period to the bank. Call Rkt the gross return to capital in time t, the amount a bank
obtains as a return over each unit of credit supplied in the form of acquired securities.
The representative goods producer owes a bank an amount QtStRkt+1 at the end of the
period. This value equals the sum of profits Πft obtained through capital utilization in
production (gross of capital remuneration) and the market value of the effective non-
depreciated capital, that could be sold back in the market after production has taken
place.
QtStRkt+1 = Πft+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1Kt+1
Substituting for Πft and St and dividing both sides by Kt+1:
QtRkt+1 = α
Yt+1
Kt+1
+ (1− δ)Qt+1
Hence, the gross return to capital in period t+ 1 is given by the ratio between the value
generated by one unit of capital acquired by the firm in period t over the price at which
it was bought.
Rkt+1 =
Zt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
(7)
2.3 Capital producers
The market for capital is competitive. At the end of each period, capital producers build
new capital for the following period using the final output as an input in the production.
Capital goods are then sold back to goods producers at price Qt. They are subject to
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convex adjustment costs in this process.10 A capital producer chooses investment It in
order to maximize discounted profits, taking the price of capital Qt as given.
Adjustment costs are a convex function of investment. The capital producers’ problem
is given by:
max Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tΛt,τ
[
QτIτ −
[
1 + f
(
Iτ
Iτ−1
)]
Iτ
]
with f(1) = f ′(1) = 0 and f ′′(1) > 0. Non-zero profits are possible when the economy is
not in steady state, and profits are transfered to the household.
The first order condition for investment is given by:
Qt = 1 + f
(
It
It−1
)
+
It
It−1
f ′
(
It
It−1
)
− EtβΛt,t+1
(
It+1
It
)2
f ′
(
It+1
It
)
(8)
This condition states that capital price will equal the marginal cost of investment.
The adjustment cost function assumes the form:
f(.) =
ηi
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
where ηi refers to the inverse elasticity of investment with respect to the price of capital.
2.4 Government
Government spending is given by Gt. To finance itself, government taxes households,
banks and issues debt, which for simplicity is bought only by banks.
The government issues debt with the following maturity structure: every period a
fraction µ of the outstanding debt stock comes due and 1− µ goes on to add to the next
period’s debt pile. This is equivalent to assuming the government always issues debt with
varying maturities, being 1−µ the ratio between the amount of debt coming due in t+ 1
and the amount coming due in t.
The objective of the paper is to study fiscal policy in the aftermath of a sovereign
default. To capture the debt restructuring in an easily tractable way we assume the
default is caused by an exogenous policy shock. We introduce this possibility in the model
by assuming that repayment is given by a random variable mt ∈ [0, 1]. The variable mt
represents the actual fraction of debt coming due at t that is repaid, and it is given by:
mt = min{ιt, 1} (9)
10As pointed out by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), adjustment costs enhance the quantitative performance of the model
without adding much complication.
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where
ιt = ριιt−1 + (1− ρι) + ειt (10)
where ρι is a positive constant and ιt is a normally distributed error term with mean 0
and standard deviation σι. In steady state, ιt = 1, meaning that the government fully
repays the amount of debt that comes due in t. However, the fraction to be repaid is
subject to shocks.
A debt restructuring episode triggered by a policy decision is captured by a one-off
negative shock on ι. The auto-regressive specification captures the fact that in case of
debt restructuring, sovereigns tend to repudiate short term debt in order to lengthen
the debt repayment profile. So repayment drops in the first periods following a default
episode but grow in time, tending again to a hundred percent of the maturing fraction as
the shock vanishes completely.11 The following section shows that in fact such a pattern
was present in the Greek Bond Exchange from 2012.
In each period, the government repays µmt of the debt. Denoting χt the price of
debt, the government’s financing requirement for period t + 1, χtAt+1, is the difference
between the fraction of debt repaid (µBt times the fraction effectively honoured mt) and
the amount of government spending that is not covered by taxes (primary deficit):
χtAt+1 = µmtBt +Gt − Tt (11)
Total outstanding (nominal) debt in t+ 1 is given by:
Bt+1 = (1− µ)Bt + At+1 (12)
Total taxes are given by the sum of all sources of taxation: lump-sum transfers, con-
sumption taxes, income taxes (wage income and capital taxes) and taxes on banks’ profits
(to be presented in the next subsection).
Tt = TRt + τ
c
tCt + τ
w
t WtLt + τ
d
t (Rt − 1)Dt + τ bt pit (13)
The government will follow some form of (autoregressive) tax rule, that prevents debt
from deviating largely from steady state. These rules will be presented later in the paper
when we talk about calibration.
To complete this subsection, gross return on bonds is the ratio between the expected
value to be payed back by the government in the next period plus the expected value of
the remaining outstanding debt divided by the current price of debt:
Rbt+1 =
µEtmt+1 + (1− µ)Etχt+1
χt
(14)
11Besides allowing for the simulation of a debt restructuring episode, this specification can also capture the fact that
sovereign debt is risky. The standard deviation of ιt can be calibrated to capture this risk.
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A shock to mt affects not only the haircut in t, but also the expected repayment in
the following periods, which induces changes in bonds’ prices, directly influencing banks’
balance sheets and investment decisions. Steady state price of government debt χt is:
χ¯ =
µ
R¯b − (1− µ) (15)
In the limiting case where µ = 1, price of debt is as standard the inverse of the bond
yield.
2.5 Banks
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), banks can raise funds from households in form of
deposits or from retained earnings, accumulating net worth. They use the available funds
to buy state-contingent securities from goods producers, but also to buy government bonds
Bt+1 at price χt. Banks are the only agents that buy sovereign debt in this economy. We
also assume that banks pay each period a tax τ bt on their profits.
A bank’s balance sheet is composed by the assets it holds (government bonds and
private securities), liabilities (deposits) and net worth:
χtBt+1 +QtKt+1 = Nt +Dt+1 (16)
Dt are deposits raised from households and we used St = Kt+1.
We make use of the notation Nt to denote post-tax net worth:
Nt = Nt−1 + pit(1− τ bt )
with
pit = r
k
tQt−1Kt + r
b
tχt−1Bt − rtDt
Net worth in t+1 is the gross payoff from assets funded at t net of returns to depositors.
Profits are given by subtracting the flow of compensation to depositors from earnings on
assets. Let Rkt+1 denote the gross rate of return on a unit of a bank’s private securities
from t to t+ 1. Net worth before taxes is then given by:
N˜t+1 = Rkt+1QtKt+1 +Rbt+1χtBt+1 −Rt+1Dt+1 (17)
with
Rkt+1 = (1 + r
k
t+1) =
Zt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
The objective of a banker is to maximize its future terminal value, given by the dis-
counted value of (net) net worth, accounting for the probabilities that she might exit at
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each future period:
Vt = Et
[ ∞∑
i=1
(1− θ) θi−1βiΛt,t+iNt+i
]
(18)
The bank’s ability to obtain funds is limited by a moral hazard constraint as in Gertler
and Karadi (2011). At each period, a banker may choose to divert a fraction λ of assets
in the form of dividends to her family and hence defaults on part of debt. In this case,
the remaining fraction 1− λ of her assests will be recovered by other depositors, leading
the bank to bankruptcy. This fraction λ is exogenous and constant. This constraint could
also be interpreted as a leverage constraint imposed by official regulation, along the lines
of the Basel Agreements. In equilibrium, leverage is pinned down by this constraint.
Anticipating the possibility of funds diversion, depositors will limit their lendings to
ensure banks won’t divert funds. The bank’s value must be at least as large as its gain
from deviating funds, so as to discourage diversion.
Vt ≥ λ(χtBt+1 +QtKt+1) (19)
The expressions in (16) and (17) yield the evolution of the bank’s net worth as a
function of the state variables Kt, Bt and Nt−1:
Nt = Nt−1 +
[
(rkt − rt)Qt−1Kt + (rbt − rt)χt−1Bt + rtNt−1
]
(1− τ bt ) (20)
Let Vt(Kt+1, Bt+1, Nt) be the maximized value of the bank’s objective. It will satisfy the
following Bellman equation.
Vt(Kt+1, Bt+1, Nt) = EtβΛt,t+1{(1− θ)Nt+1 + θmax [Vt+1(Kt+2, Bt+2, Nt+1)]} (21)
In each period, the banker chooses a portfolio composition of capital and bonds, Kt+1
and Bt+1, in order to maximize her value function subject to the incentive constraint and
the law of motion for net worth, taking into account that she might exit with probability
(1− θ).
We conjecture the value function to be linear in the balance sheets’ components:
Vt(Kt+1, Bt+1, Nt) = νtQtKt+1 + ζtχtBt+1 + ηtNt (22)
In the Appendix we show that this conjecture is true, as long as:
ηt = EtβΛt,t+1Ω˜t+1
[
1 + rt+1(1− τ bt+1)
]
(23)
νt = EtβΛt,t+1Ωt+1 (Rkt+1 −Rt+1) (24)
ζt = EtβΛt,t+1Ωt+1 (Rbt+1 −Rt+1) (25)
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with
Ωt = (1− τ bt )Ω˜t (26)
and
Ω˜t+1 = 1− θ + θ [φt+1ζt+1 +$t+1(νt+1 − ζt+1) + ηt+1] (27)
The auxiliary variable $t is the leverage only in terms of capital:
$t ≡ QtKt+1
Nt
(28)
Each component of the banks’ value function can be interpreted as follows: ηt is saving
in deposits’ costs from an additional unit of net worth. The variables νt and ζt are
the marginal discounted gains of expanding, respectively, private securities’ holdings and
government bonds’ holdings. Finally, Ω˜t is the shadow marginal value of net worth and
affects the banks’ intertemporal discount factor.
Optimization for banks will imply the following no-arbitrage condition:
EtβΛt,t+1Ωt+1 (Rkt+1 −Rt+1) = EtβΛt,t+1Ωt+1 (Rbt+1 −Rt+1) (29)
Define φt as the leverage ratio, the maximum ratio of bank assets over equity:
φt ≡ QtKt+1 + χtBt+1
Nt
The constraint in (19) can be rewritten as:
νtQtKt+1 + ζtχtBt+1 + ηtNt ≥ λ(χtBt+1 +QtKt+1)
If this constraint binds, we get:
φt =
ηt +$t(νt − ζt)
λ− ζt
Which, using (29), simplifies to:
φt =
ηt
λ− ζt (30)
2.6 Evolution of bank’s net worth
The total net worth in the banking sector equals the sum of existing banks’ net worth
Ne,t and entering banks’ start-up capital Nn,t provided by their families. The net worth
of existing banks equals the net earnings from assets over liabilities from one period
to another, i.e., earnings from holding securities plus earnings from holding government
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bonds, minus costs from deposits, net of taxes. This expression must be multiplied by
the fraction θ of banks that survive between periods:
Ne,t = θNt−1 + θNt−1(1− τ bt ) [(Rkt −Rbt)$t−1 + (Rbt −Rt)φt−1 + (Rt − 1)] (31)
Families transfer to each new banker a constant fraction ω/ (1− θ) of total assets from
exiting bankers, given by (1− θ)[QtKt + χtBt], also after taxes. Hence entering bankers’
net worth will be:
Nn,t = ω(1− τ bt )(QtKt + χtBt) (32)
Total net worth from banks in the economy is thus:
Nt = Ne,t +Nn,t
2.7 Market clearing
Output can be used for consumption, government spending or investment (including ad-
justment costs). Aggregate demand is given by:
Yt = Ct + It
[
1 + f
(
It
It−1
)]
+Gt (33)
Market clearing in the goods market requires the expression for demand in (33) to equal
supply, given by (5).
The banks’ balance sheet can be written as:
QtKt+1 + χtBt+1 = φtNt
Demand for securities and bonds is given by the balance sheet constraint, given by (30).
The supply of securities by firms is given by the expression for capital accumulation:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It
Finally, market clearing for deposits is obtained from balance sheet identity. Total
deposits supplied by families must equal the difference between banks’ assets and net
worth.
Dt = QtKt+1 + χtBt+1 −Nt
3 Calibration
In order to study how fiscal policy in the aftermath of debt restructuring affects the
sovereign-bank loop, we use the model from Section 2 to simulate a debt restructuring
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episode and run a series of counterfactual exercises, with different fiscal policy responses.
The model economy is calibrated to capture the sovereign-bank loop in the Greek economy
on the verge of the 2012 debt restructuring episode. We thus begin this section by briefly
describing this case.
3.1 The Greek Debt Restructuring
The 2012 Bond Exchange in Greece was the outcome of a public budget deterioration that
became evident with the countercyclical policies following the 2007-08 Great Recession
and revealed itself much worse once previous unreliable fiscal data was revised. This led
to a deep confidence crisis and a sharp increase in spreads for Greek debt. A first proposal
for a bond exchange in 2011 (one year after a rescue package had been agreed upon with
the IMF and the EU) and the following fiscal consolidation effort by the Greek government
were shown to be insufficient, since the deep recession and the postponement of structural
reforms precluded a deeper adjustment. After further negotiations a huge bond exchange
program was agreed upon for March 2012, with major private sector involvement, a feature
already present in the 2011 proposal.12
The Greek Restructuring consisted of a lengthening of the average maturity and large
debt relief. Restructuring implied an average residual maturity increase for Greek securi-
ties from 7 years in 2011 to more than 12 years in 2012, although at the aggregate level
the repayment profile for bonds shifted into the future was largely compensated by short
term repayment of EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) notes (official loans).13
Figure 1 plots the evolution of debt in aggregated terms and interest payments, both
as fractions of GDP. One can observe a drop in general government consolidated debt
as a share of GDP from 2011 to 2012, which, in terms of debt relief, resulted in a face
value reduction of around 52%, or a reduction of 12 percentage points in Debt/GDP
ratio. Notwithstanding this immediate relief, debt-to-GDP ratios started to recover fast,
returning to pre-default levels after a few years. The evolution of interest payments in
terms of GDP is also interesting: it drops by almost half from 2011Q4 to 2012Q1, after
the bond exchange was conducted. Average haircut was 65%, with higher losses for short
term investors.
12For a more detailed account of the Greek Debt Restructuring, see Zettelmeyer et al (2013).
13This reflects another important feature of the Greek Restructuring, i.e., a change in composition of debt holders towards
official lenders.
15
Figure 1: Greece: Debt-to-GDP
3.2 Counterfactual Greece
The Greek Debt Restructuring was accompanied by some degree of fiscal contraction:
total taxes were raised and expenditures were cut. Nevertheless, had the restructuring
not happened, the fiscal effort required for servicing debt would have probably been much
larger than observed. This is precisely the starting point from our exercise.
In our laboratory economy, we consider a counterfactual steady state that aims at
capturing a scenario with no Bond Exchange in Greece in 2012. Since the absence of
default would have increased substantially debt servicing costs, the debt and tax levels
in this counterfactual steady state are higher than their actual values observed in Greece
before default. We then simulate a shock that resembles the Greek Bond Exchange from
2012. The restructuring is thus accompanied by expansionary fiscal policy, but that is
relative not to reality in 2012, but to the counterfactual steady state with higher debt
and taxes.
To complete the assumptions, we impose that the fiscal room opened right after the
restructuring shock is exactly the difference between the counterfactual and the actual
debt servicing levels. In the following periods, fiscal policy will react to deviations of
debt from steady state such that in the medium run debt returns to pre-default levels.
Hence, after a sizeable relief on impact, debt recovers in the medium run, returning to pre-
default levels after some years. This assumption is in agreement with empirical evidence
that suggests debt-to-GDP ratios tend to return, on average, to pre-default levels some
years after restructuring.14 Hence default opens some fiscal space in the short run, but
14Benjamin and Wright (2009) estimate an average duration of default episodes of between 7-8 years, starting from
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the long run debt burden does not seem to be significantly reduced.
In order to calculate the hypothetical increase in taxes that would have been necessary
in the absence of debt restructuring, two assumptions are made: (i) government spending
does not change with respect to the value observed in 2012; (ii) the hypothetical debt in
the absence of default in 2012 is the debt observed at the end of 2011 times the average
year-over-year debt growth between 2008 and 2011. The additional debt service in the
absence of default comes from two sources: from the haircut itself, i.e., from the face value
reduction of debt; and from the decrease in interest payments over debt.15
This additional debt servicing need is the extra amount of tax revenues that would
have been required in the absence of restructuring. Table 1 compares variables observed
in 2012 and their counterfactuals. In terms of total debt, we calculate an increase in debt-
to-GDP of 46 percentage points in comparison to the one observed after restructuring.
This implies additional taxes of almost 4 p.p. in terms of GDP. Taking into account only
government debt held by banks (the share that we consider in the model), we observe an
even larger increase relative to the value observed in 2012. This is due to the change in
composition of lenders, that left private agents with little participation in debt holdings
after the bond exchange. In terms of debt servicing needs, the reduction was in the region
of 40%.
3.3 Calibration
Sovereign debt restructuring affects an economy in a variety of ways. Our model and
calibration aim at capturing the sovereign-bank channel only. Hence, default on debt
in the hands of households or foreign agents is not considered in our simulations. Our
calibration matches key features of the Greek economy surrounding the March 2012’s
Bond Exchange. The model’s steady state portrays Counterfactual Greece in 2012 and
the default shock captures the main characteristics of the observed debt restructuring.
3.3.1 The Fiscal Rule
Figure 2 presents revenues per type of tax as a share of total taxes in 2012, calculated
using data from Eurostat on tax items and aggregating by categories. The model is
declaration of default until the resolution of the negotiations. They also find that after this period, face value debt-to-GDP
is already 5% higher than before default announcement for the median country. Nevertheless, the increase in average debt
maturity and the fall in interest rates provide some degree of debt relief.
15The first effect is given by the difference between hypothetical debt and observed debt, multiplied by the average interest
rate from 2007 to 2011. The second is the observed debt times the difference in the average interest rate before and after
the bond exchange. The interest rate considered for this calculations is the ratio between interest payments and total debt,
using data from Eurostat.
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Table 1: Counterfactuals for Model Simulation
2012 (total debt) 2012 (only banks’ debt)
2011 Observed Counterfactual 2011 Observed Counterfactual
Debt* 356,289 305,094 393,386 59,092 28,218 65,448
Debt/GDP** 172% 160% 206% 28% 15% 34%
Taxes 47,323 46,706 53,466 47,831
Taxes/GDP 22.9% 24.4% 28.0% 25.0%
Var(%) (2012/counterf - 1) -12.6% -2.4%
Debt Service*** 9,743 16,503 1,621 2,746
Savings from default 6,760 1,125
Var(%) (2012/counterf - 1) -41.0% -41.0%
*General Government Consolidated Gross Debt (million Euros)
**Assuming the same GDP for Counterfactual Greece
***Average interest rate before default: 4,2%; Interest rate in 2012: 3,2%
calibrated to match this tax composition. ‘Other’ taxes are bundled as lump sum taxes.
Figure 2: Tax rates for selected items
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Eurostat
Table 1 shows that total tax revenues in case of default are 2.4% lower than in Coun-
terfactual Greece, when we consider bank’s debt only. We target this amount of tax
reduction when default hits the economy and compare the response of the economy al-
lowing one tax rate to be cut at a time, calibrating the rule parameter to achieve this size
of decrease on impact for each tax.
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We now turn to the fiscal rules assumed to close the model. The government has a
set of tax rates to manipulate and can also increase exogenous expenditures, with the
objective of not letting real value of debt deviate largely from steady state. The speed
of this adjustment is given by the parameter ρb and is related to the convergence of debt
to the steady state level. Tax rates also have an autoregressive component, ρx, as in the
following equation:
Xt = (1− ρx)X¯ + ρxXt−1 + ρb
(
χtBt − χ¯B¯
)
with
Xt =
{
τwt , τ
c
t , τ
d
t , τ
b
t , TRt, Gt
}
The parameter ρb is calibrated to target desired response of taxes after the shock (it
assumes negative values in case of government expenditures), that match both the initial
desired drop in taxes and the time until debt converges again to steady state in line with
the already mentioned empirical evidence on default. Across the exercises we compare
scenarios for which the government uses one tax instrument at a time, leaving the other
tax rates fixed at steady state values. The autoregressive component of the tax rule, ρx,
is set to 0.9 and is also subject to variations in sensitivity analyses.
3.3.2 Parameters and Steady States
In order to match the main characteristics of the Greek macroeconomy in 2012, govern-
ment consumption is set to 21.3% of GDP, gross capital formation is 12% of GDP and
consumption comprises the remaining fraction (66.7%), given that we consider a closed
economy. These values are almost exactly the ratios found in data for Greece in 2012
(Eurostat), with deviations corresponding to net exports, that are not accounted for in
the model.
For the “real” sector, we set desired risk premium that, together with depreciation
rate and capital share in output, determine the capital/labour ratio for the economy. In
order to match those ratios we set depreciation rate (δ) to 8.5% per year, capital share in
production (α) to 0.33 and the intertemporal discount rate (β) to 0.98. The steady state
spread of capital return over the risk free rate, Rk −R, that in the model also represents
spread from bond return over risk free Rb−R, is set to 5.8% per year. This value is close
to the annualized spread of 10-year Greek bonds over German bonds observed in 2010.16
16We opted for this value that reflects better a longer run equilibrium rate, instead of the very volatile spreads observed
from mid-2011 until 2012, reflecting market uncertainty surrounding the negotiations of the Greek default. Indeed, when
calculating debt relief achieved with default in Greece, Zettelmeyer et al (2013) opt for a discount rate that reflects expected
future borrowing conditions, which would hang from 3.5 to 8% per year.
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Table 2: Parameters
Households
β 0.98 Intertemporal discount rate
σ 1 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ψ 1 Labour weight in utility
ϕ 3 Inverse elasticity of labour supply
Financial Intermediaries
λ 0.47 Fraction of assets that can be diverted
ω 0.003 New banks initial capital transfer
θ 0.89 Banks survival rate
Firms
α 0.33 Capital share in production function
δ 0.085 Exogenous depreciation rate (yearly)
ηi 1.7 Inverse elasticity of investment to capital price
Inverse elasticity of investment to capital price, ηi, follows the conventional value from
papers that add adjustment costs to investment, such as Gertler and Karadi (2011).
Parameters of the GHH preferences follow conventional calibration in the literature.
Labour disutility equals 1 and the Frisch inverse elasticity of labour supply, ϕ, is set to
3, implying a labour supply elasticity equal to 1/3. In case of labour income taxes, these
values imply that the Laffer curve peaks when the labour tax rate is around 75%.17 Table
2 summarizes the parameters in our calibration.
The other set of aggregates regards debt and banks (the “financial side”). We target
two key ratios: debt as a fraction of total assets and the leverage ratio. Since our focus is
to study the sovereign-debt loop, public debt is held by banks only. To calibrate debt as
a fraction of total assets we use consolidated data from the Bank of Greece on Balance
Sheet of Credit Institutions. Denoting debt as the sum of securities and loans to the
domestic government and assets as the sum of all domestic assets (to roughly reflect our
closed economy), we arrive at a value of 16% for debt/assets, also in line with evidence
presented by Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2013). This data also provide government
debt as share of total debt equal to 29%, which is Debt/GDP in our model. Recalling
that we model a counterfactual steady state with a higher Debt/GDP equal to 206%, we
adjust the values mentioned above proportionately and set steady state debt/assets to
18%, which gives a value of 32% for Debt/GDP.
17Trabant and Uhlig (2011) characterize Laffer curves for EU countries in a neoclassical growth model featuring constant
Frisch elasticity preferences. They find an average peak that goes from 62 to 68%, which would imply a larger elasticity of
labour supply and thus strengthen our results when this labour taxes are used.
20
Leverage ratio is set to 6.5, in line with Bankscope data on Greek banks, most of them
important creditors of their own government.18 Parameters that determine leverage in
the model are λ and ω, respectively, the share of divertable assets and the initial capital
transfer to new bankers.
We then choose µ accordingly to reach a debt’s term to maturity equal to 7.4 years,
the value observed in data before the restructuring. As already mentioned, we only focus
on the specific channel of default through balance sheets of banks. Besides, we do not
account for important movements in debt’s composition after default that, as shown in the
previous section, moved towards higher participation of official lenders’ loans in expense
of privately held securities, the share of total debt directly affected by the bond exchange.
Concerning the fiscal block of the model, steady state government consumption and
debt service imply taxes are 26% of GDP, a value slighly higher than the counterfactual
one presented in the previous section. Table 3 shows model steady state aggregates and
ratios and comparison to Counterfactual Greece. Details on the time series used and
assumptions are in appendix.
3.3.3 The Debt Restructuring Exercise
As previously displayed, the bond exchange in Greece had two important features: a
substantial lengthening of the repayment profile and a considerably high average haircut,
leading to a present value debt relief of almost 50% in terms of GDP (Zettelmeyer et
al, 2013). To match those two features, we set persistence of the shock to 0.93 and the
standard deviation to 0.8, which imply the shock does not fade away during the simulation
horizon. Those values refer to, respectively, ρι and σι. As showed in Figure 3 this two
parameters from our shock specification match pretty closely actual haircuts according to
debt maturity, as calculated in Zettelmeyer et al (2013).
The baseline tax response targets the difference between taxes in the (counterfactual)
steady state and the one observed in data for 2012. We target a reduction of 2.4% on
impact in aggregate taxes and calibrate ρb for each tax rate to match this reduction. We
compare the response of the economy by letting one tax component react according to
the fiscal rule at a time, leaving fixed the other tax rates.
As for the face value reduction, endogenous effects might produce an initial impact
that might be slightly different from the targeted 50% drop due to endogenous response
18Leverage in the model corresponds to the fraction of banks’ total assets over net worth. Using data on banks Tier1
Capital or Total Capital for net worth, we find an average for 2010-12 respectively, of 7.2 and 5.1, so we opt to use a value
close to the average of both, which is 6.1.
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Table 3: Model Steady States and comparison to Data?
Variable Model SS Data (counterfactual†)
Private Consumption / GDP (%) 66.7 67.4
Fixed Capital Formation / GDP (%) 12.0 12.8
Government Consumption / GDP (%) 21.3 21.7
Debt / GDP (%) 31.7* 28.5 (33.5)
Term to Maturity (years) 7.4 7.4
Leverage Ratio 6.5 6.1**
Debt / Total Assets (%) 18.2 16.2 (19.2)
Spread (year) (%) 5.8 6.0***
Taxes / GDP (%) 26.0 24.4 (25.1)
Income Tax / Total Taxes (%) 27.0 27.2
Wages and Salaries / Interest on Deposits (%) 83.5 82.0
Wage Taxes / Total Taxes (%) 22.2 22.3
Deposit Taxes / Total Taxes (%) 4.9 4.9
Consumption Taxes / Total Taxes (%) 42.4 42.5
Bank Taxes / Total Taxes (%) 1.8 1.8****
Other Taxes / Total Taxes (%) 28.8 28.6
?Data sources and details in appendix.
†Values in parentheses refer to the counterfactuals calculated from data.
*Debt/GDP in the model: χB/4Y . **Average 2010-2012. ***2010. ****Average 2001-08.
Figure 3: Actual (left panel) and Simulated (right panel) Haircuts
Source of actual haircuts: Zettelmeyer et al (2013)
of other model’s variables when taxation is distortionary, what might affect debt price.
4 Results
The steady state of the model represents a situation with no default and, consequently,
with an amount of taxes and government spending that allows for serving the full debt.
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Debt default would either change (reduce) the amount of taxes required for debt repay-
ment or allow for more government spending. In this section, we study how sovereign debt
restructuring coupled with different fiscal policy responses affects the sovereign-bank loop.
The fiscal response following a sovereign default can differ in two main dimensions: (i)
the difference in tax revenues between the default and the counterfactual scenario can
come from changes in different taxes; and (ii) the post-default amount of debt can evolve
in different ways. For the first point, we study the effect of a sovereign debt restructuring
shock coupled with a reduction (compared to a counterfactual scenario with no default)
in (i) lump sum taxes; (ii) increases in government purchases; (iii) taxes on consumption;
(iv) taxes on labour; (v) taxes on return on capital; and (iv) taxes on banks. In order
to deal with the second point, we allow for different speeds of convergence of the level
of debt to the steady state – while always assuming that, consistently with the empirical
evidence, debt eventually comes back to its pre-default level.
Simulations were conducted using Dynare. The results presented in the paper consider
a first order approximation around the steady state of the model. In Appendix C, we show
the conclusions are robust to changes in consumers’ preferences (our baseline exercises
employ a GHH utility function) and in the tax rule.
4.1 Changes in different taxes
4.1.1 Lump sum taxes
In our baseline exercise, we consider a fiscal rule that allows only for changes in lump sum
taxes, leaving other tax rates constant at their steady-state values. Lump sum taxes are
not common in the real world, but feature in several models exploring the nexus between
sovereign and bank credit risk.19 Figure 4 shows the impulse responses. In comparison to
the counterfactual presented in Table 1, this scenario considers a fall in lump sum taxes
calibrated to generate a 2.4% drop in tax revenues on impact.
The price of debt falls by more than 40% and recovers slowly in line with the haircut
dynamics. The value of debt among banks’ assets drops by the targeted 50% on impact.
The ensuing financial disruption is translated into a fall in the price of capital. The
mechanism is the following: the decline in banks’ net worth together with their leverage
constraint forces banks to deleverage, leading to a fire sale of assets. Capital prices thus
drop and private credit is reduced. This leads to an investment drop. The drop in asset
demand by banks is reflected in the increase of the spread of capital returns over the
risk-free rate on deposits.
19Examples include Boccola (2016) and Perez (2015).
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Figure 4: Response to debt restructuring with a change in lump sum taxes
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The result is a very persistent but mild fall in the level of capital and output. The present
value of output deviations is 1.3% of (yearly) GDP. Wages and labour supply behave in a
similar way. A transfer from banks to the government leads to a fall in economic activity
owing to the effects of this transfer on banks’ balance sheets.
In Section 4.2, we will show that the financial disruption stemming from the sovereign-
bank loop has a more severe impact on the economy in case fiscal policy is more lax
and the level of debt quickly returns to its previous level. In this baseline exercise, face
value debt returns to steady state levels around 6 years after default, which is in line with
previous evidence from debt restructuring episodes (Benjamin and Wright, 2009; Wright,
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2011).
Next, we show that the conclusions from this section heavily rely on the type of tax
considered in the exercise.
4.1.2 Government spending
Figure 5 displays the response of the economy when all tax rates are kept fixed and
sovereign debt restructuring allows for an increase in government consumption. The
increase in G on impact is calibrated to compensate for the 2.4 percentage-point fall on
taxes from the counterfactual.
Figure 5: Response to a change in government consumption vs. lump-sum taxes
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In the short run, the effect on capital and output is similar to the case with lump sum
taxes. However, after around 10 quarters, the difference between both cases is very pro-
nounced. The increase in government consumption following default crowds-out private
consumption and investment, contributing to worsen the diabolic loop. Owing to this
crowding out effect, the effects of the financial disruption are very persistent. Investment
and consumption reach, respectively, a 10% and 5% fall in the medium run, and output
is almost 2% below its steady state after 10 years.
Hence, in our laboratory economy, restructuring debt instead of cutting government
expenditures leads to a fall in investment and consumption owing to the ensuing financial
disruption. It follows that cutting government consumption would avoid a deep and also
very long recession.
4.1.3 Taxes on labour income and consumption
We now consider fiscal rules that allow for changes in labour taxes and in consumption
taxes, respectively. In each of these exercises, other tax rates are constant at their steady-
state values. One can speculate that labour taxes would be a natural candidate for a
tax raise to generate extra revenues and repay debt in the absence of sovereign debt
restructuring. Such a conjecture follows from the fact that the Greek Bond Exchange
was accompanied by an important change in income tax rates, which increased the share
of this specific tax source in total tax revenues –20 and while income taxes come from
wage taxes and taxes on household savings, the share of income tax revenues originating
from wage taxation corresponds to around 80%. Hence the case with labour taxes is a
particularly interesting one.
Figure 6 displays the responses of the economy following a sovereign restructuring
shock coupled with reductions in labour taxes compared to a case with reductions in
consumption taxes. The fall on tax revenues on impact is calibrated to match the 2.4%
fall. Tax rates follow the fiscal rule afterwards. The responses of the economy now are
completely different.
With lower income taxes, workers are willing to supply more labour. Pre-tax wages
are lower, but post-tax wages are larger. The reaction of labour supply is key to the
economy’s response. The lower labour costs raise incentives for firms to invest. Interest
rates are larger in order to incentivize households to save. The drop in investment is thus
20Income tax rates in Greece increased by more than 50% from 2011 to 2012 and decreased a little in 2013. In contrast,
consumption tax rates remained relatively constant. This caused income taxes’ share in total taxes to increase by 35% in
comparison to 2011, while the share of consumption taxes decreased by 4 percentage points. Taxes on capital (of various
forms) remained more or less constant, although they had increased importantly from 2010 to 2011.
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short-lived. The financial disruption is quickly offset by the effect of lower labour costs.
Figure 6: Response to a change in wage and consumption taxes vs. lump-sum taxes
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Output goes up despite the initial drop in capital stock. The increase in output reaches
1.5% after 5 years. Household’s utility increases in the short run, following the increase in
consumption, drops in the medium run when labour supply is very high and turns positive
again in the long run. Overall, households are better off following debt restructuring.
The message from this exercise is that sovereign debt restructuring coupled with a
change in labour taxes does not generate a diabolic sovereign-bank loop. The fall in
the value of debt does reduce banks’ lending capacity, so investment and capital fall in
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the short run. However, the increase in labour taxes required to serve debt would have
even more negative effects on the economy. The lower labour taxes (as compared to the
counterfactual) boost labour supply and the overall effect is positive. The cost of austerity
by means of larger labour taxes beats the cost of financial disruption.
On impact, the response of the economy in the case of consumption taxes is very
similar to the case of labour taxes. Both labour and consumption taxes affect the net
wage in terms of consumption goods. Hence, initially, the response of pre-tax wages,
labour supply and output are similar in both cases.
However, the fall in consumption taxes also reduces the incentives for savings. Indeed,
interest rates R fall on impact, deposits fall by more than in the case of labour taxes. As
time goes by, we observe a sharp – if delayed – fall in investment. The capital stock in the
medium and long run falls. The increase in consumption boosts utility in the short run,
but also crowds out investment, so in a few years, consumption, output and household’s
utility are below their steady-state levels.
In sum, in our laboratory economy, if sovereign debt restructuring comes in place of a
hike in consumption taxes, the effect is positive in the short run, but after a few years,
the ensuing financial disruption dominates and leads to a fall in economic activity.
4.1.4 Taxes on capital income and on banks
Finally we study the response of the economy when sovereign debt restructuring occurs
in place of increases in capital (deposits) and bank taxes. Figure 7 shows the response
of the economy in both cases. The effects are similar (except for the response of pre-tax
interest rates R, as one would expect). In both cases, the result is an increase in capital
accumulation and output.
Default is a transfer from banks to the government, but so are taxes on bank’s profits.
However, default is a one-off transfer, while taxes on banks affect their marginal lending
decisions. The positive effects of sovereign debt restructuring accompanied by a fall in
taxes on banks (as compared to the counterfactual with no default) stem from these
positive effects on bank credit.
The effect on investment is positive – to the point that, initially, it crowds out con-
sumption. As time goes by, the resulting increase in capital stock leads to larger output.
Labour supply does not respond significantly, so wages increase. It takes more than 4 years
until consumption hits its steady-state level, but then it increases even further. Overall,
in our laboratory economy, sovereign debt restructuring is better than an increase in taxes
on banks’ profits.
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Figure 7: Response to a change in savings taxes and bank taxes vs. lump sum taxation
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The effect of sovereign debt restructuring in place of an increase in taxes on deposits
is very similar. Taxes on banks directly discourage credit, while taxes on households’
deposits make their liabilities more expensive. As shown in Figure 7, the response of the
economy is basically the same in both cases.
Both in this case and in case of labour taxes, the deleterious effects of sovereign default
on the banking system are more than compensated by the relatively lower taxes. However,
the response of the economy is different in the short and in the long run. In the short run,
output and consumption react more strongly in case of labour taxes. The main reason
is that the labour supply reacts quickly to changes in taxes. In the case of deposit and
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banking taxes, investment is stimulated in the short run, but since capital accumulation
takes time, the output response peaks only after 5 years. In terms of their effects on the
sovereign-bank loop, taxes on banks’ profits and on deposits play very similar roles.
4.1.5 The fiscal response matters
In our laboratory economy, the fiscal reaction after a sovereign default that disrupts finan-
cial intermediation is crucial to determine whether and how diabolic the bank-sovereign
loop is. On the one hand, sovereign debt restructuring in place of non-distortionary (lump-
sum) taxation or non-productive government expenditures harms the economy even if no
other default cost is considered. On the other hand, the financial disruption caused by a
sovereign default harms the economy less than the increases in (labour or capital) income
taxes that would be needed to fully serve the debt.
The benefits of a sovereign debt restruturing that avoids larger taxes on banks or on
capital income appear mostly in the long run – debt restructuring reduces consumption
in the first 4 years following the default. In contrast, debt restructuring in place of
consumption taxes provides some short run boost to the economy but has significant
negative effects in the long run.
4.2 The speed of fiscal responses
In the previous exercises we set the parameter ρb of the fiscal response to debt restructuring
so as to match in all cases a decrease in total taxes of 2.4% (compared to a counterfactual
scenario with no default). In this section we let fiscal policy react to a greater extent to
the default with a faster decrease in taxes. Debt recovers faster than in the baseline case
and is back to its steady state level in less than seven years. We analyse the cases of lump
sum, labour and deposit taxes.
In the case analyzed in Section 4.1.1, debt restructuring coupled with a relief in lump
sum taxes gives rise to a very mild recession. Here, we observe that larger falls in taxes on
impact give rise to a more pronounced fall in economic activity. In case taxes respond so
quickly that the value of outstanding debt χB is back to its steady state level in around
two years, the fall in capital is large and leads to an output drop that reaches 0.6% (with a
similar effect on wages). Intuitively, the fall in taxes is partly compensated by government
debt issuance. Leverage-constrained banks have thus less room for buying firms’ assets.
Hence, owing to its effects on banks balance sheets, sovereign debt crowds out capital
accumulation.
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Figure 8 considers the case of changes in lump-sum taxes and compares the response of
the economy when the parameter ρb of the fiscal rule is, respectively, two and four times
higher.
Figure 8: Response to a change in lump-sum taxes: effect of speed
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In the short run, there is a consumption boost because agents have more disposable
income but investment cannot grow owing to the constraints on banks. The overall
effect is however negative. Table 4 shows that the cumulated negative effect on output
of a sovereign restructuring coupled with a relief in lump sum taxes is not so small if
ρb is large. It compares the present value percentage drop in output due to the shock
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relatively to remaining in steady state. The table shows that annualized loss of output
almost doubles when the speed of adjustment is four times larger.
Table 4: Present Value of Output deviations, varying the speed of adjustment (accumulated up to 15
years, annualized)
ρb 2ρb 4ρb
Output -1.3% -2.1% -2.5%
Figure 8 also makes clear that different speeds of adjustment generate responses that
are not a simply scaled version of one another. In particular, they have different implica-
tions in the short and in the long run. The deeper the initial fall in taxes following debt
restructuring, the faster nominal debt starts to grow and the largest is the crowding out
effect of sovereign debt issuance on capital accumulation.
Figure 9 shows a similar comparison for labour taxes. In this case, there is a clear
trade-off between short-run and long-run effects. In the short run, a more responsive
fiscal rule further stimulates labour supply and output, contributing to alleviate the fi-
nancial disruption and increase investment. Nevertheless, the subsequent faster increase
in nominal debt makes tax cuts short-lived and in the medium run taxes start to increase,
discouraging labour supply and generating a downward movement in the economic cycle.
From the perspective of the financial disruption following default, the short run recovery of
asset value is faster, both because real debt value increases via nominal debt and because
investment grows since firms are expanding. But this recovery is also not long-lasting and
is different in its composition: asset value recovers mainly because banks buy more debt
at a lower price. In contrast, in the baseline case, the stimulus provided is smooth but
prolongued, and capital recovery is more pronounced in the long run. This is due to little
crowding out effect of sovereign debt on capital accumulation – debt remains low for a
longer time. Moreover, a very responsive fiscal stance is more likely to generate cycles,
whereas a more contained rule avoids volatility and the economy returns to steady state
after a shorter horizon.
Figure 10 shows a similar exercise letting deposit taxes respond. The crowding-out effect
here is very important. In the baseline case, the response of output, capital and labour is
very strong. The effect on output and capital in the other two cases is always weaker, if
not negative, no matter the horizon. This happens precisely because faster debt increase
after the restructuring crowds out capital recovery, owing to the leverage constraints faced
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Figure 9: Response to a change in labour taxes: effect of speed
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by banks. The difference between this and the exercise with labour taxes is that in the
latter case, the labour response to tax cuts stimulates firms’ demand for capital, which
leads to more investment and attenuates the crowding out effect.
In sum, this section shows that if policy is too responsive, the crowding out effect
inhibits accumulation of capital assets. In the short run, the effect depends on the tax
that responds to debt fluctuations, but in the long run, a smoother fiscal stance is better.
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Figure 10: Response to a change in deposit taxes: effect of speed
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5 Final Remarks
We presented a simple model that captures the sovereign-bank loop and calibrated it to the
Greek economy in the quarters surrounding the 2012 Bond Exchange. Our contribution is
to study how rules targeting different tax instruments and speeds of fiscal reaction shape
the response of this laboratory economy to a debt restructuring shock.
Sovereign default forces leveraged-constrained banks to deleverage, which has a nega-
tive impact on investment and output. As it turns out, different fiscal policy responses
interact with this deleveraging effect in different ways: increasing government consump-
tion crowds out investment, which prevents the economy from recovering in the medium
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run; lower labour taxes (compared to a counterfactual scenario with no debt restructuring
and larger taxation needs) raise the marginal productivity of capital and the demand for
investment, which more than offsets the losses from financial disruption; lower consump-
tion taxes also raise the labour supply in the short run, but the stimulus for consumption
crowds out investment and hence hurt the economy in the medium run; lower taxes on
banks offset the effect of default and also affect marginal lending decisions, so the effect
on investment is positive; lower taxes on deposits affect the economy in a very similar
way by reducing the costs of funds for investment; and a more conservative fiscal stance
(lower speed of adjustment) leads to a quicker recovery since government debt crowds out
space for capital investment in banks’ balance sheets. Thus how diabolic the post-default
sovereign-bank loop is depends to a great extent on the way fiscal policy responds.
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A Banks allocation problem
Using the conjecture for the value function form suggested in (22), we can write the
Lagrangian for the banks’ maximization problem. Banks will maximize its terminal
value (18) subject to the constraint (19).
L = νtQtKt+1 +ζtχtBt+1 +ηtNt−µt [λ(QtKt+1 + χtBt+1)− (νtQtKt+1 + ζtχtBt+1 + ηtNt)]
That can be simplified to
L = [νtQtKt+1 + ζtχtBt+1 + ηtNt] (1 + µt)− µtλ(QtKt+1 + χtBt+1)
where µt is the Lagrangian multiplier with respect to the incentive constraint. The
first order conditions for Kt+1, Bt+1 and µt are:
νt(1 + µt) = µtλ
ζt(1 + µt) = µtλ
λ(QtKt+1 + χtBt+1) = νtQtKt+1 + ζtχtBt+1 + ηtNt
The first and second FOCs are symmetric. On the left hand side is the marginal benefit
for the bank from expanding each of the assets components and on the right hand side the
marginal cost of tightening the incentive constraint by λ. The last FOC is the incentive
constraint itself.
The constraint binds (µt > 0) only if the marginal discounted value of both the banks
assets is positive. In case the constraint binds, the FOCs for securities and bonds show
that the discounted marginal value for each of those components should be equal. It
means that in the margin, the bank is indifferent from investing resources in government
bonds or private securities.
Now we show that the conjectured form of the value function holds. From (20), (21)
and (22) we have:
νtQtKt+1+ζtχtBt+1+ηtNt = EtβΛt,t+1{(1−θ)Nt+1+θ [νt+1Qt+1Kt+2 + ζt+1χt+1Bt+2 + ηt+1Nt+1]}
Using the definitions of $t and φt, we simplify the above equation to:
LHS = EtβΛt,t+1{(1− θ)Nt+1 + θNt+1 [νt+1$t+1 + ζt+1(φt+1 −$t+1) + ηt+1]}
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Inserting the definition of Ω˜t we get:
LHS = EtβΛt,t+1Ω˜t+1Nt+1
Substituting for Nt+1:
LHS = EtβΛt,t+1Ωt+1
· [(rkt+1 − rt+1)QtKt+1(1− τ bt+1) + (rbt+1 − rt+1)χtBt+1(1− τ bt+1) + (1 + rt+1(1− τ bt+1))Nt]
Comparing the terms for Kt+1, Bt+1 and Nt, we see that the conjecture holds if (24),
(25) and (23) hold.
B Data
Table 5: Data Sources and Description
Variable Source Description
Private Consumption E Final Consumption Expenditure of Households
Fixed Capital Formation E Gross Fixed Capital Formation
Government Consumption E Final Consumption Expenditure of General Government
Debt E, BG Loans and Securities from Domestic General Government
Interest Payments E Interest, payable
Term to Maturity B Average Residual Maturity
Leverage BS Average (inverse of Tier1 Ratio and total capital ratio)
Assets BG Claims on Domestic Entities
Net Worth BG Capital and Reserves (Greek Commercial Banks, Consolidated)
Banks’ Profits BG Profit Before Tax (Greek Commercial Banks, Consolidated)
Deposits BG Deposits to Domestic Credit Institutions (by households)
Interest paid on Deposits (rD) BG Interest Expense (Greek Commercial Banks, Consolidated)
Total Wages (WL) E Wages and Salaries
Taxes E Total Tax Receipts
Income Tax E Taxes on Individual or Household Income
Wage Taxes E Income Taxes * WL / (rD + WL)
Deposit Taxes E Income Taxes * rD / (rD + WL)
Consumption Taxes E Value Added Type Taxes, Excise Duties and Consumption Taxes
Bank Taxes E Current Taxes on Capital
E: Eurostat, BG: Bank of Greece, B: Bloomberg, BS: Bankscope
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C Sensitivity analysis
C.1 Persistence of tax rule (ρx)
The baseline tax rule has an autoregressive component ρx calibrated to 0.9 in the baseline
exercises. We now compare the response of labour taxes setting this parameter to 0.8.
Figure 11 (appendix) displays results and shows that the effect of a less persistent tax
rule is similar to the one of less responsive fiscal rule in terms of comparison between
short and long run response. However there is not a very noticeable difference in terms
of cycles generated in the economy.
Figure 11: Response to a change in labour taxes: effect of rule persistence
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C.2 Changing preferences
Our model assumes households have GHH-type preferences, which have the particular
feature of generating a labour supply that depends only on the real wage. This formulation
hence shuts down the wealth effect on the labour supply.
In order to guarantee that our (qualitative) results are not attached to the particu-
lar form of utility function used, we simulate the model alternatively using KPR-type
preferences, following King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988):
u(C,L) = lnCt − ψ L
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
(34)
This specification makes utility separable in consumption and labour. Labour supply
choice will not be independent from consumption and wealth effects are present. The first
order conditions change to:
ψLϕt =
(1− τwt )Wt
(1 + τ ct )Ct
(35)
Λt,t+1 ≡ Ct
Ct+1
(1 + τ ct )
(1 + τ ct+1)
Figures 12 and 13 (in appendix) address the exercises with labour and capital taxes
for this type of preferences. Qualitatively results do not seem to change much. The key
difference in both cases lies in the labour response and generates a small quantitative
difference for the utility path.
For the case of labour taxes the KPR preferences make labour react less to the fiscal
rule, for the same cut in taxes. This milder reaction also causes investment no to increase
as much as for GHH preferences, and so GDP and consumption increase less. This
is exactly due to the wealth effect from equation (35): an increase in real wage also
increases consumption, so that labour responds less to a similar increase in net wage.
Output increases around 1/3 less, due to smaller labour and capital reaction.
The case of deposit taxes is distinct in that labour supply reacts more in the short
run. The decrease in capital taxes stimulates savings at the expense of consumption, as
in the GHH case. But with KPR preferences, this implies an immediate increase in labour
supply. In the long run labour supply falls as consumption starts to increase following
output expansion. Quantitatively the effect on output and utility, as well as the size of
the effects on banks and the fiscal side, are very close.
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Figure 12: Response to a change in labour taxes: GHH vs. KPR utility function
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Reaction for consumption and bank taxes (available upon request) follow, respectively,
the qualitative response of labour and deposit taxes. This subsection clarifies thus that
the qualitative effects discussed above do not lie on the assumption about the utility
funcion neither do much the quantitative ones.
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Figure 13: Response to a change in deposit taxes: GHH vs. KPR utility function
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